"Candidate Quality in European Parliament Elections" by Hobolt, Sara Binzer, & Hoyland, Bjorn.
 
 
Candidate Quality in European Parliament 
Elections 
 
 
 
 
SARA BINZER HOBOLT 
University of Oxford 
Department of Politics and International relations 
sara.hobolt@politics.ox.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
BJORN HOYLAND 
University of Oslo 
Department of Political Science 
bjorn.hoyland@stv.uio.no 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Draft paper. 
Please do not cite without permission from the authors. 
Comments very welcome. 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Tenth Biennial 
International Conference, Montreal, Canada * May 17-May 19, 2007   1 
Abstract
  
 
European Parliament (EP) elections are characterized by low turnout and defection 
from governing parties to smaller parties. The most common explanation for this is 
that European elections are ‘second order national elections’, which voters use to either 
punish  the  government  or  simply  abstain.  However,  so  far  the  literature  has  not 
considered whether the quality of the candidates in EP elections is a contributing factor 
to these patterns of voting. In this paper, we examine whether low levels of turnout 
and  defection  from  governing  parties  are  influenced  by  the  quality  of  candidates 
elected to the EP. We use a unique dataset on the background of each of the Members 
of the European Parliament (MEPs) from 1979 to 2006 to examine the determinants 
cross-national and cross-party variation in candidate experience and prominence, as 
well  as  the effect  on  turnout and electoral  fortunes  of  parties.  Finally,  we examine 
whether the quality of candidates provides a good indicator of their activities in the 
Parliament.  We  find  systematic  differences  in  candidate  quality  across  the  member 
states.  Higher  candidate  quality  increases  turnout  and  contributes  to  the  electoral 
success of parties in EP elections. The drawback seems to be that the qualities that 
make  candidates  stand  out  in  EP  election  campaigns  make  for  inactive  committee 
members. 
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Introduction 
 
- A good candidate can win it, no matter how bad the conditions. 
(Jacobson and Kernell 1983:99) 
 
Despite the increasing powers of the European Parliament (EP), turnout has been on 
the decline since the first direct election in 1979. Moreover,  voters tend to ‘punish’ 
governing  parties  and  vote  for  smaller  rather  than  larger  parties  in  European 
Parliament  elections.  Most  scholars  in  the  field  rely  on  the  ‘second  order  national 
election theory’ to explain these patterns of voting. This posits that European elections 
are  mid-term  contests,  which  allow  voters  to  express  their  dissatisfaction  with 
governing parties and vote more sincerely than in ‘first-order’ national elections  (see 
Reif  and  Schmitt  1980;  Marsh  1998;  van  der  Eijk  and  Franklin  1996;  Carrubba  and 
Timpone  2005;  van  der  Brug  and  van  der  Eijk  2007;  Hix  and  Marsh  2007).  Yet,  a 
potentially crucial factor, which has received little attention in the study of European 
Parliament elections,  is the  quality of  candidates who  are elected  to  EP.  This  lack  of 
attention is surprising given the extensive literature on candidate quality US elections 
which  demonstrates  the  importance  of  candidate  quality  to  the  competitiveness  of 
elections  and  electoral  outcomes  (see  e.g.  Jacobson  and  Kernell  1983;  Lublin  1994; 
Carson et al. 2001). 
This paper examines the causes and consequences of campaign quality in EP 
elections.  In  line  with  previous  US  studies,  we  operationalise  candidate  quality  in 
terms of the political experience and profile of each candidate. Our focus is fourfold. 
First, which parties put high-quality candidates forward in EP elections? Second, does 
candidate quality influence turnout? Third, what is the electoral effect of nominating 
high  quality  candidates?  Fourth,  and  finally,  how  does  the  selection  of  quality 
candidates influence the level of involvement in the legislative processes in the EU?   
In  line  with  the  formal  literature  on  elections  as  sanctioning  and  selection 
devices,  we  expect  that  voters  will  use  EP  elections  not  only  to  sanction  national 
governments, but also to select quality candidates (see Fearon 1999). We thus expect 
that  parties  will  nominate  politically  experienced  candidates  to  achieve  electoral   3 
success and be especially likely to do so in candidate-centered electoral systems where 
the electoral pay-offs are likely to be higher. Given that the European Union arena in 
general and the EP in particular have traditionally been regarded as ‘second-order’ to 
national politics, the nomination of high-profile candidates in EP elections is both a 
very costly signal for parties (resources are removed from the national arena) and a 
very prominent signal to send to voters (voters are likely to take notice). We therefore 
expect  that  quality  candidates  will  mobilize  voters  and  lead  to  electoral  gains  for 
parties. We are less certain, however, that candidate quality serves as a guarantee of 
legislative  activity  in  the  EP  parliament.  Conversely,  we  expect  that  high-profile 
candidates  are  less  likely  to  participate  in  the  day-to-day  committee  work  of  the 
Parliament.  
To  test  these  hypotheses  statistically,  we  compiled  a  unique  dataset  on  the 
quality and activity levels of all elected MEPs in the period 1979-2006. Our findings 
suggest that candidate quality is indeed an important variable in determining electoral 
outcomes, but that quality does not guarantee higher levels of involvement in the EP 
legislative process. 
 
 
Existing literature on European Parliament elections 
 
One of the key empirical findings in the EP election literature is that parties holding 
national office tend to do poorly in EP elections. Another is that turnout is considerably 
lower than in national legislative elections. The most common explanation of these 
phenomena  is  the  ‘second-order  national election’  thesis.   At  the heart  of  Reif  and 
Schmitt’s (1980) theory of second-order national elections is the proposition that they 
are of lesser importance than first-order elections for national office (see also Reif 1984; 
van  der  Eijk  and  Franklin  1996;  Marsh  1998).  Given  the  lower  importance  of  EP 
elections, parties devote fewer resources to these campaigns and there are generally 
lower incentives for people to vote and engage with the issues at stake. This second-
order nature of EP elections has consequences for several aspects of voting behavior. 
First, levels of turnout tend to be lower than in national elections. Secondly, citizens are   4 
more  likely  to  vote  sincerely  than  strategically,  and  this  in  turn  will  tend  to  favor 
smaller parties. Finally, EP elections allow voters to express their dissatisfaction with 
governing  parties.  According  to  the  theory,  the  extent  to  which  governments  are 
punished  in  EP  elections  depends  on  when  the  EP  election  is  held  in  the  national 
electoral cycle. This has roots in theories of mid-term elections in the US, where the 
president’s party tends to enjoy a comparative disadvantage (Campbell 1960). This can 
either reflect a natural ‘cycle of popularity’ for governing parties, which declines mid-
term  (Reif  1984;  Marsh  1998),  or  a  negative  retrospective  judgment  of  economic 
performance (Tufte 1975; Fiorina 1981; Kousser 2004).  
There is a great deal of evidence showing that governing parties tend to do 
worse in EP elections relative to their performance in the national general election and 
that this defection is greatest around mid-term elections (Reif 1984; van der Eijk et al. 
1996; Marsh 1998; Kousser 2004; Ferrara and Weishaupt 2004; Hix and Marsh 2007). 
Recent studies have suggested that the high levels of abstention and defection may also 
be due to Euro-skepticism, that is, dissatisfaction with governing parties over their 
position  on  European  integration  (Ferrara  and  Weishaupt  2004;  Hobolt,  Spoon  and 
Tilley 2006; Marsh 2007). These studies show that  defection from governing parties in 
EP elections is not only due to an evaluation of parties on the basis of domestic politics, 
but is also driven by concerns specific to the European dimension,  In a systematic 
comparison of the ‘Europe matters’ and the ‘second-order’ and theses, Hix and Marsh 
(2007) employ aggregate-level data from the past six European elections to analyze 
whether voter desertion of governing parties is punishment over domestic matters or 
protest over Europe. They find some electoral gains for anti-EU parties and parties that 
emphasize  the  European  issue.  But  in  support  of  the  second-order  approach,  they 
demonstrate that large parties tend to lose votes in EP elections regardless of their left-
right placement or their European position.  
These  studies  thus  provide  a  compelling  explanation  for  patterns  of  voting 
behavior in EP elections. However, none of the existing literature has examined the 
effect of the quality of candidates on electoral behavior in EP elections.  A few studies 
have examined the characteristics and career paths of MEPs. Scarrow (1997) explores 
how a seat in the EP fits into a domestic political career path. She finds considerable   5 
cross-national  variation  in  the  background  of  MEPs,  but  concludes  that  the  EP  is 
increasingly attracting ‘careerist’ candidates who view the Parliament as their principal 
political  arena.  Norris  and  Franklin  (1997)  also  examine  the  background  of  MEPs.  
They find that the EP is very social unrepresentative and that the chances of gaining a 
winnable seat in EP election is more strongly related to supply-side factors, such as 
gender,  incumbency  status  and  motivation,  than  demand  side  factors,  such  as 
gatekeeper demands. These studies give us an important insight into the composition 
of the European Parliament, but do not explicitly address the question of how MEP 
experiences affect electoral outcomes or legislative activities. 
This is surprising since there is a vast literature which highlights the impact of 
candidate  quality  on  both  turnout  and  electoral  prospects  in  US  elections  (see,  for 
example Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Krasno 1994; Lublin 1994; Carson et al. 2001; Stone 
et al. 2004). The implicit assumption of the second order approach seems to be that the 
quality  of  candidates  is  generally fairly  low,  since  parties are  unlikely  to nominate 
politically  experienced  and  high-profile  candidates  to  a  second-order  arena.  Yet, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that the quality of candidates is far from negligible. For 
example, when the Danish Social Democrats (in opposition at the time) nominated the 
former Danish Prime Minister, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen to lead their EP party list in 
2004, the party’s share of the vote increased by 19 percentage points compared with the 
previous EP election – an electoral gain which was widely attributed to the ‚Nyrup 
effect‛; that is, the quality of this single candidate.  In the next section, we outline the 
theoretical reasons for why and how variation in candidate quality may affect electoral 
outcomes  and  legislative  performance,  and  we  also  present  a  number  of  testable 
hypotheses. 
 
 
Candidate quality and electoral consequences 
 
According to the formal literature on elections, there are two principal mechanisms by 
which  elections  may  bring  about  democracy,  or  rule  according  to  the  people: 
sanctioning and selection (Banks and Sundaram 1993; Ferejohn 1993; Fearon 1999). In the   6 
classic tradition of democratic theory, which understands elections as mechanisms of 
political accountability, elections are inherently a  sanctioning device in which voters 
reward or punish incumbents on the basis of past performance and thereby induce 
elected  officials  to  be responsive  to  public  preferences  (see  Key  1966;  Fiorina  1981; 
Manin 1997; Powell 2000). Alternatively, voters may use elections not as sanctioning 
devices, but as opportunities to choose a ‚high quality‛ political representative, that is 
one with personal characteristics such as integrity, shared preferences, experience and 
skill  (Fearon  1999;  Besley  2005).  In  the  formal  literature  on  electoral  control,  the 
distinction is implied in the discussion of moral hazard (sanctioning) versus adverse 
selection (selection) (see Ferejohn 1993; Fearon 1999).  
  The  second-order  national  election  literature  implicitly  adopts  a  sanctioning 
approach to European Parliament elections. EP elections are seen as midterm contests 
on the performance of the national government (Hix and Marsh 2007). Hence, voters 
use these elections to sanction national governments. There are several reasons why it 
is reasonable to argue that voters sanction the performance of national governments 
rather than their European representatives in EP elections. First, since EP elections do 
not translate into the formation of a government at the European level, voters cannot 
use  these  elections  to  punish  or  reward  the  European  executive  institutions;  the 
Commission  and  the  Council  (see  Føllesdal  and  Hix  2006).  Second,  voters  receive 
minimal  information  about  the  European  Parliament  through  the  media  and  other 
information channels  and  it  is  thus close  to  impossible for citizens  to monitor  and 
evaluate the performance of individual MEPs and thereby make informed judgments 
about  whether  to  reelect  on  this  basis.  In  comparison,  information  about  national 
incumbents is far more accessible to most voters. Hence, in line with the second-order 
theory, we would expect that EP elections involve the sanctioning of national rather 
than European politicians. However, this does not exclude the possibility that voters 
also use the EP elections as a selection tool. 
  Given  voters’  limited  ability  to  hold  MEPs  to  account  in  EP  elections,  they 
might  use  these  elections,  at  least  partially,  as  an  opportunity  to  select  quality 
candidates. As Fearon (1999) has noted, ‘voters think about elections much more as 
opportunities to try to select good types than as sanctions to deter shirking by future   7 
incumbents’. It could even be argued that given the agency problems that voters face in 
EP  elections  with  limited  information  about  MEP  activities  they  might  be  more 
susceptible to elect candidates on the basis of their quality, rather than to judge them 
on the basis of past performance. As Besley argues, politician quality is a valence issue, 
‘every citizen wants more of it regardless of the policy choices being implemented’ 
(Besley 2005: 47-8). There is an extensive empirical literature on US elections, which 
supports the notion than the quality of candidates affect voter considerations  The key 
findings in the literature on US legislative elections is that the strategic decision to 
stand  as  a  challenger  in  an  electoral  contest  is  influenced  by  the  quality  of  the 
incumbent  (high  quality  incumbents  will  deter  challengers  from  running)  and  that 
voters respond positively to the quality of both the incumbent and the challenger (high 
quality candidates have more electoral success [see Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Lublin 
1994; Carson et al. 2001; Stone et al. 2004; Stone et al 2006]).  
 Most  of  the  US  literature  on  candidate  quality  has  focused  on  prior  office-
holding  experience.  As  Jacobson  and  Kernell  argue:  ‘the  base  of  office  itself  is  an 
important resource. Intuitively, we assume that people who previously managed to get 
elected to public office at least once should be more effective campaigners than those 
who have not’ (1983:30). Some scholars use a simple dummy variable which contrasts 
candidates with and without prior experience in public office (Jacobson and Kernell 
1983; Lublin 1994), while other scholars have refined this measure by calibrating the 
status of the previous offices held (see Krasno and Green 1988). Other studies have 
taken  an  even  broader  approach  to  candidate  quality,  which  encompasses  both 
strategic resources (ability to mount a successful campaign) and personal resources 
(skills, characteristics and qualities) (see Stone et al. 2004; Stone et al. 2006). As we 
describe  in  our  Data  and  Variables  section  below,  this  paper  adopts  the  former 
approach  to  candidate  quality  and  focuses  primarily  on  office-holding  experience 
calibrated by the status of the office, and we also include other high-profile positions in 
our measure. 
  But  how  important is  the  ‘selection  mechanism’  in  EP  elections?  One  factor 
which determines whether the voters choose candidates on the basis of quality is the 
extent  to  which  there  is  sufficient  variation  in  the  quality  of  candidates.  If  all   8 
candidates  are  of  similarly  low  quality,  the  selection  mechanism  would  not  work. 
Voters would not be able to choose the ‚good representative‛ and would opt for the 
sanctioning  of  national  incumbents  instead.  The  received  wisdom  surrounding  the 
quality of candidates in EP elections is that they are either young and inexperienced or 
old  and  about  to  retire,  and  hence  their  ‘quality’  is  low.  However,  an  increasing 
proportion of MEPs choose Brussels as their main career whilst others shift between 
prominent national positions and representation in the European Parliament (Scarrow 
1997). 
Hence, the first question to examine is when and why do parties nominate high 
quality  candidates  to  the  European  Parliament?  The  nomination  of  politically 
experienced  and  high-profile  candidates  in  second-order  EP  elections  is  potentially 
very costly for national parties, as quality candidates may be useful in the national 
political arena. The availability of high quality candidates may thus be a limiting factor 
(Besley  2005).  Parties  in  government  may  have  a  smaller  pool  of  high  quality 
candidates  to  choose  from  than  other  parties.  We  therefore  expect  that  parties  in 
opposition are more likely to send high quality candidates than parties in national 
government. This leads to our first hypothesis. 
 
H1:  Parties  in  national  opposition  have  a  higher  quality  of  MEPs  than  parties  in 
government. 
 
The decision to put forward high or low quality candidates is of course not only a 
question of availability of quality candidates. The effect of the decision on the electoral 
outcome is likely to guide the decision. We also thus expect parties to be more likely to 
nominate high quality candidates in electoral systems where it is expected to give the 
highest  electoral  pay-off.  In  candidate  centered  electoral  systems,  such  as  Single 
Transferable Vote and Open List PR, where the voters are more likely to pay attention 
to  and  vote  on  the  basis  of  candidate  quality,  we  would  expect  higher  quality 
candidates: 
   9 
H2: Countries with candidate centered electoral systems have a higher quality of MEPs 
than countries without. 
 
As discussed above, empirical research on US elections has shown that high quality 
candidates attract more voters.  We would expect a similar effect in EP elections. Well-
known  candidates are more likely  to receive media  attention than less  well-known 
candidates.  This  is  particularly  important  in  the  generally  lackluster  EP  election 
campaigns. Media attention may of course be a mixed blessing. While it is more likely 
that supporters will be aware of the candidate’s quality and turn out to vote, it may 
also serve to mobilize the supporters of the other parties. This may particularly be the 
case if well-known but unpopular candidates are put forward.  In general, we expect 
that since high quality candidates attract more attention from the media, campaigns 
with higher quality candidates will mobilize more voters: 
 
H3: High quality MEP candidates will have a positive effect on turnout in EP elections, 
all other things being equal. 
 
By nominating a high-profile candidate, parties also send a costly signal to voters. We 
know from the literature that voters rely on cues and shortcuts when making decisions 
in  elections.  According  to  the  signaling  literature  one  important  persuasive  cues  is 
‘observable costly effort’ (see Lupia and McCubbins 1998), and arguably nominating 
high-profile candidates to the EP represents such effort on the part of parties. Hence, 
theories  of  signaling  and  theories  of  selection  mechanisms  would  both  lead  us  to 
expect that candidate quality results in positive electoral feedback for parties. 
 
H4: High quality candidates will have a positive effect on the vote share of parties in 
European Parliament elections, all other things being equal. 
 
Our final question concerns whether the quality of candidates - that is their profile and 
experience – is a good indicator of their performance in the EP once they have been 
elected? In other words, does quality provide a credible cue to voters about the amount   10 
of effort that a candidate will put into his or her role as an MEP? The focus of activity 
in the European Parliament is different from national European parliaments. There is 
no government whose mandate is drawn from the European Parliament. The EP’s role 
in the appointment and censuring the European Commission does not fully compare. 
MEPs  are  not  normally  public  figures.  The  EP  is  not  a  grand  debating  chamber. 
Instead, MEPs spend their time in committees bargaining over detailed legislation. The 
importance  of  the  committee  system  is  well-known.  Rapporteurships,  the 
responsibility of an individual member to draw up the position of the committee, are 
important, both for individual MEPs and their party. Hence, parties that care about 
policy should send candidates that are capable and willing to act as rapporteurs. The 
important  skills  in  this  job  are  the  ability  to  form  coalitions  and  be  capable  of 
bargaining  with  other  committee  members,  the  EP  plenary  and  the  other  EU 
institutions.  This  type  of  people  may  be  different from  the  type  of  people  that  are 
capable of capturing the public’s imagination in the public debate.  Also, many well-
known politicians go to the European Parliament as the last stage in their career. These 
candidates  may  have  high  public  visibility,  but  they  may  be  less  focused  on 
contribution in committees. This leads us to our final hypothesis:    
 
H5:  High  quality  candidates  are  less  active  in  committee  work  than  lesser  known 
MEPs.  
 
To sum up, we expect that candidate quality affects both turnout and the electoral 
fortunes of parties, but that ‘star quality’ has a negative impact on the activity levels of 
the individual MEP in the Parliament. 
 
 
Data and variables 
 
To  test  the  hypotheses  outlined  above,  we  have  collected  data  on  the  quality  and 
activity levels of successful candidates in all 6 EP elections. As described above, quality 
has been operationalized as previous political experience. However, rather than using   11 
of simple dummy variable of previous position in office, we have created an additive 
scale of various aspect of previous experience, calibrated by the level of the position. 
The highest post in the index is president or prime minister in the country (with a 
multiplicative weight of 5), the second highest positions are previous ministerial posts, 
party  leadership  and  other  high  profile  positions  (e.g.  Mayor  of  Paris  or  famous 
author), all weighted by 3. Finally, members of national parliaments are also given a 
(double) score. In addition to these position variables, we also include a single score, 
which captures MEPs who enter the EP in their prime political age between 35 and 55. 
Candidates who enter later are likely to use it as a retirement home, whereas MEPs 
under 35 have little experience. These data on political experience were obtained by 
systematically coding the biographies of all MEPs included in the Times Guide to the 
European Parliament as well as EP and party websites and other party documents. As 
shown in table 1A in the appendix, this quality index of individual MEPs ranges from 0 
to 34 with a mean of 2.14 and a standard deviation of 2.60.  Candidate quality has a 
highly  skewed  distribution with  many  zeros,  given  the high number of  candidates 
with little or no political experience.  
 It is important to point out that we were unable to collect information everyone 
who stood as a candidate in the European Parliament,  and hence our dataset only 
consists of those people who were actually elected. Not only has it not been feasible to 
obtain accurate list of every single party candidate since 1979, but even if this would 
have  been  possible,  we  would  have  struggled  to  find  the  necessary  biographical 
information on the thousands of unsuccessful candidates. This exclusion potentially 
has  consequences  for  our  analysis  of  the  effect  of  candidate  quality  on  electoral 
outcomes,  since  we  do  not  have  a  measure  of  the  quality  of  the  unsuccessful 
candidates. However, this problem is partly alleviated by the fact that parties tend to 
rank  order  party  lists  according  to  the  prestige  of  candidates.  Hence,  high  quality 
candidates are likely to be listed as one of the top candidates and are consequently 
unlikely  to  be  among  the  unsuccessful  candidates.  To  ensure  that  our  results  are 
robust, we test the effect of candidate quality on electoral outcomes in two ways. First, 
we test the effect of the average quality of all party candidates on overall electoral 
gains or losses for that party. This could be argued to provide a conservative test of the   12 
effect of candidate quality. Since most parties only have few, if any, prestigious (or 
quality) candidates, and tend to place these near the top of their lists, those parties that 
are very successful EP elections are forced to included more ‘inexperienced’ candidates 
due to their electoral fortune and we would consequently expect that the ‘average’ 
quality of their candidates would go down. In other words, because of the short supply 
of  quality  candidates,  an  increase  in  the  number  of  MEPs  would  also  lead  to  the 
selection of more novices.  Second, we examine the effect of the ‚maximum quality‛ of 
a party’s candidate on electoral outcomes. This allows us to test the proposition that a 
party will benefit from the candidacy of a single very high-profile candidate (such as a 
former prime minister), rather than simply relying on the average quality across all 
party candidates.  
  In figure 1, we present both mean and maximum candidate quality by country 
in each of the six European Parliaments. Country-level descriptive statistics can be seen 
in table 3A. The figure includes two indicators of quality. The right-hand dot indicates 
the mean quality of candidates in a particular country and parliament. The mean quality 
of candidates at the country level ranges from 0.82 to 8. The left-hand point indicates 
the maximum candidate quality in a country in a particular year. Here we can see that 
quality varies much more. On average the highest quality candidate scores 10, with a 
standard deviation of 5.5, but this ranges from 2 to 34. France and Italy stand out, as 
these are the countries were most former presidents and prime minister  have been 
elected  to  the  European  Parliament,  including  Jacques  Chirac,  Edgar  Faure,  Valéry 
Giscard D’Estaing, Bettino Craxi and Silvio Berlusconi.  
 
 [Figure 1 about here] 
 
Whereas maximum candidate quality may vary from one election to another, cross-
national differences in mean candidate quality are quite stable over time. For example, 
Luxembourg  has  very  high  quality  candidates  across  most  elections,  and  Belgian, 
Danish and Irish parties also provide on average high quality candidates. In contrast, 
the UK, the Netherlands and Germany tend to provide candidates of a lower quality. 
Ireland is the country where the between party differences is the largest, as measured   13 
by the size of the standard deviation. The variation between the Greek parties is also 
quite large. The variation between parties seems to be smallest in Belgium and Italy.  
In this paper we seek to explain not only why candidate quality differs across 
parties and countries, but more importantly, how this affects election outcomes and 
legislative activities. In section below we describe the other variables in our models. 
 
Variables in models 
We analyze four models in this paper. The first model examines the determinants of 
candidate quality. Candidate quality at the party level is thus the dependent variable. 
In the remaining models, candidate quality is an independent variable. In the second 
model, we examine the effect of MEP quality on country-level turnout and in the third 
model,  we  analyze  the  impact  of  quality  on  electoral  gains  and  losses  of  parties. 
Finally, the fourth model seeks to explain individual legislative activity by individual 
MEPs.  Tables1A to 3A in the appendix present the descriptive statistics for individual, 
party and country-level data.  
  Our first model seeks to explain why some parties have higher quality MEPs 
compared with others. To test our first hypothesis, we include a dummy variable for 
Government  Party  that  captures  the  effect  of  whether  a  party  is  in  government  or 
opposition, and hence takes the value 1 if a party was in government at the time of the 
European election, and 0 if the party was in opposition. We also include a dummy 
variable  for  candidate  centered  electoral  systems  to  test  our  second  hypothesis.  Two 
countries have candidate centered electoral systems, Ireland and Finland. We expect 
that the candidates that emerge in these systems differ from those of other electoral 
systems. The effect of electoral system is interesting in itself as it is up the each member 
state to decide on the details of the electoral system for the EP elections. It is also 
important to control for this effect in order to ensure that the other results are not 
artifacts of this difference in the electoral system. In addition to these key independent 
variables, we also control for the size of the party2, since large parties may be able to 
nominate  higher quality candidates than smaller parties. We also include separate 
                                                 
2 Party size is measured in terms of the vote-share a party received in the national election immediately 
prior to the European election.   14 
dummy variables for Green and Euro-skeptic parties, since we expect their candidates 
to  have less  previous  political experience.  If  parties  are  fighting  their very first  EP 
election,  they  might  be  keener  to  send  high  quality  candidates,  so  we  include  an 
indicator for first EP election. Finally, we include a measure of electoral volatility in the 
country, since electoral volatility may affect the type of candidates that run for EP 
elections. 
In our second model the dependent variable is turnout.  It is measured as the 
difference  between  in  turnout  between  the  EP  election  and  the  previous  general 
election in each country. Our key independent variable is candidate quality, measured 
as both mean quality (model 1) and maximum candidate quality (model 2) in each 
country. We also include additional controls. Previous research has shown that the 
norm of alternating in the government influence turnout. We control for government 
alternation.  Control  variables  are  also  included  for  various  aspects  of  the  electoral 
system that may influence turnout: candidate centered systems, electoral threshold and 
compulsory voting. In countries where people are very skeptical about the EU, they 
may be less likely to turn out in EP elections, so we include a control for public support 
for the EU.3 Again, we also control for electoral volatility and first EP elections. 
In our third model, electoral gain is our dependent variable . This variable is 
measured as the change in the vote-share of a political party between the previous 
general  election  and  the  subsequent  European  Parliament  election.  Again,  our  key 
independent variables are mean and maximum candidate quality at the party level. To 
control  for  second-order  effects,  we  include  a  government  dummy  variable.4  As 
described  above, one of the most solid findings in the literature is  that governing 
parties tend to do less well in EP elections than in the previous elections that won them 
the office. This is widely interpreted as evidence of a second -order national contest 
effect. One should however be aware of the regression to the mean  effect which might 
operate here. If we assume that there are both structural and stochastic elements that 
determine vote choice and that those parties that win the right to form a government 
                                                 
3 Following Hix and Marsh (2007), we use public opinion data from the Eurobarometer surveys. 
4 In previous estimations of this model we also include a time since last election variable. If there is such an 
affect as ‚office-tiredness‛ we would expect governing parties to do worse to longer they spend in office 
and opposition parties to do better. However, neither the direct effect, nor the interaction is statistically 
significant.   15 
have done better in the elections than the parties that have not won this right. If this is 
purely due to a stochastic element, then these parties would on average do worse if a 
new election is held, even if the structural component of their electoral base is the 
same. Following the second-order national election theory, we also include dummies 
for Green parties, as they should do better if people vote sincerely, and the size of 
parties. We would expect large parties to experience greater electoral losses than small 
parties. If voters base their vote choices at least partly on European issues, we would 
also expect Euro-skeptic parties to gain votes in EP elections. 
In  our  final  model  on  legislative  activities,  we  use  individual  level  data  to 
investigate the effect of candidate quality on the amount of committee work individual 
MEPs  take  on.  We  collected  information  on  all  committee  reports  since  1979.  The 
information for the 1979-1999 periods was obtained from EP officials.5 The post-1999 
period was taken directly from the EP webpage. Our key independent variable is the 
quality of the individual EMO. We also include dummy variables for each of the party 
families, since we may expect some party families to be more active than others. 
Moreover, we include variable on EU position, since we would expect that MEPs 
belonging  to  more  EU-positive  parties  may  be  more  involved  in  the  legislative 
activities.6  We  also  need  to  control  for  the  position  of  individual  MEPs  on  EP 
committees, since chairmanships of committees are likely to induce MEPs to write 
more report. Finally, we also control for first elections and electoral system. 
In the next section, we discuss the results when we estimate these models. 
  
 
Results 
 
The first step in the analysis of candidate quality is to establish whether there are any 
systematic differences in the type of candidates the parties put forward. We investigate 
variables associated with both parties and the political system. As discussed in the 
                                                 
5 We thank Simon Hix for helping us obtaining this data. 
6 The data on EU position are taken from two party expert surveys  by Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen 
(1999) and Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver (2006). These have been rescaled so they range from 0 to 20. 
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previous section, we use both the mean quality of the successful candidate and the 
maximum  quality  of  any  individual  candidate within each  party  at each  European 
Parliament election. The dependent variable is truncated at zero. It is possible that the 
uncorrelated  residual  assumption  is  violated.  We  hence  estimate  tobit  regression 
model with robust standard errors to account for these two violations of the standard 
OLS assumptions.  
We  expect  that  electoral  volatility  of  the  political  system  will  increase  the 
quality of the candidate parties put forward as more is at risk. The type of electoral 
system  is  also  likely  to  influence  the  choice  of  candidates.  The  candidate  centered 
electoral systems used Ireland and Finland are likely to run higher quality candidates 
than  other  countries  (hypothesis  2).  Anti-EU  parties,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  Green 
parties,  are not  as  integrated in  the  party  system  as  other  parties.  This  limits  their 
ability to produce the type of candidates that scores high on our index. It is hence 
necessary to control for these parties. Similarly, larger parties should have a larger pool 
of quality candidates and hence score higher on our index on average.  We also expect 
that governing parties follow a different strategy from opposition parties as more of 
their  pool  of  candidates  will  be  occupied  with  holding  office  at  the  national  arena 
(hypothesis 1). Finally, it is likely that the first election to the European Parliament 
attracts higher quality candidates than subsequent elections.  
We estimate two models. They are identical expect that model 2  use the highest 
recorded quality  amongst  the  successful  candidates from  a  party  as  the  dependent 
variable while  model 1 use the mean quality. The results are presented in table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The results show that the quality of the candidates that run for EP office is on 
average higher in candidate centered electoral systems compared to party centered 
systems.  Green  parties  have  lower  candidate  quality  than  other  parties.  These  two 
effect  hold  across  both  specifications.  Party  size  increases  the  maximum  candidate 
quality, but not the mean quality.  There is no difference in candidate quality between 
governing and opposition parties.   17 
Electoral volatility increases the mean level of candidate quality, but does not 
significantly influence the maximum quality. A similar pattern holds for the effect of 
first  time  elections.  The  explanation  is  that  both  electoral  volatility  and  first  time 
elections increases the interest of the parties to supply many good candidates. The 
latter do to the opening of a new set of political offices available. The former is due to 
the fact that electoral volatility increases the available pool of politicians that have had 
the possibility of holding the types of posts included in the index. Rapid changes in the 
political  fortune  increase  both  the  probability  that  more  active  politicians  have 
experience  from  national  office,  and  the  probability  that  there  are  a  larger  pool  of 
‚failed‛ party leaders being shipped off to Brussels. If the latter is the main effect we 
would not expect that candidate quality increases electoral success. Instead, we would 
expect it to be associated with electoral failure. This would mean that our index would 
not be a good indicator of quality. We address this in the two next sub-sections. Next 
we turn to the effect of candidate quality on turnout.  
 
Candidate quality and turnout 
As we have demonstrated that there are significant differences between parties in the 
quality of their successful candidates, we move on to investigate the effect of candidate 
quality on turnout in EP elections. Low, and falling turnout is a source of concern 
amongst  observers  of  EP  elections.  One  of  the  justifications  for  the  European 
Parliament  is  democratic  legitimacy.  Some  authors  argue  that  strengthening  the 
powers  of  the  European  Parliament  will  help  to  reduce  the  democratic  deficit. 
However, as the powers of the EP have increased, the tendency of falling turnout has 
not stopped. It is problematic for the EP to claim it represents the views of all European 
citizens, if most citizens do not take part in the elections. It is the role of the elites to 
provide  meaningful  alternatives  for  the  people  to  choose  between  in  elections 
(Schumpeter 1942). The electorate will be capable of making more meaningful choices 
if it is easy to distinguish between the competing elites. The previous record for other 
public offices may provide information that enables the electorate to see the choice 
between the competing elites as meaningful and hence turn out to vote.    18 
We  present  an  evaluation  of  the  extent  to  which  candidate  quality  affects 
turnout in table 2. As before, we use two different indicators for candidate quality, the 
mean  candidate  quality  in  the  country  in  a  particular  election  and  the  maximum 
candidate quality in a particular election. The first specification implies that turnout is 
affected  be  the  average  quality  of  the candidates,  while  the latter implies  that  it  is 
affected by the profile of the candidate with the highest quality only. The latter case 
means that one high quality candidate suffice to influence turnout.  
The dependent variable is difference between turnout in the previous general  
elections  and  subsequent  European  Parliament  elections.  As  described  above,  we 
control for several variables.  Compulsory voting is expected to have a positive effect 
on turnout. The norm of government alternation is also expected to have a positive 
effect. Effective threshold should have a negative effect on turnout as it reduces the 
electoral chances for smaller protest parties, and hence make it less meaningful for 
dissatisfied voters to use the EP elections to protest against the government and the 
other major parties. Falling turnout has by some observers been seen as a sign that the 
EP lacks support amongst the public. We would thus expect turnout to be lower in 
countries it the public is hostile to the integration project. We expect the second order 
effect to be lower (turnout to be higher) during the first EP election in a country. The 
reported results are OLS regression with robust standard errors. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Table  2  shows  that  the  electoral  quality  of  the  candidates  increases  turnout  in  EP 
elections. The mean quality has a bigger effect than the maximum quality. But both are 
significant. For example, one standard deviation increase in the mean candidate quality 
(1.359) is associated with an increase in turnout by almost 3 percent. One standard 
deviation in the maximum quality (5.55) is associated with an increase in turnout of 
about  2  percent.  Unsurprisingly,  turnout  is  substantively  lower  in  countries  with 
compulsory voting. It is also higher in those countries that have a norm of alternating 
governments. Candidate centered electoral system have higher turnout turn-out than 
other  countries.  The  effect  is  not  as  strong  when  the  mean  measure  of  candidate   19 
quality, rather than the maximum level is used. This is however not surprising given 
that countries with candidate centered electoral systems also have parties that produce 
higher quality candidates (see above). It does not look like it is the fact that it is the first 
EP election that explain turnout. Instead, it seems like there are more high quality 
candidates in the first elections. It is hence the quality of the candidates, not the fact 
that it is the first EP elections that explain high turnout. Hence, parties could reduce the 
trend of falling turnout by ensuring that the quality of the candidates running for EP 
elections do not deteriorate. It is also clear that more pro-EU publics turn out in greater 
numbers for  the  EP elections  than  Euro-skeptic  publics.  The effect  of one  standard 
deviation (12.75) change in attitudes towards the EU changes turnout by more than 2.5 
percent.  So, candidate quality increases turnout. There are two possible explanations 
for this. It may be the case that it increases turnout because voters turn out because 
they want to vote against well-known national figures, not because they support them.  
 
Electoral gains and losses 
Having considered the consequences of candidate quality on turnout, we now turn to 
the electoral consequences of the type of candidates that are selected. The dependent 
variable  is  the  change  in  the  vote  share  of  a  political  party  between  the  previous 
general election and the subsequent European Parliament election.  Again, we estimate 
2 alternative models. The first model measure candidate quality at the party mean. The 
second measures the maximum quality of any of the successful candidates within a 
party. The reported results are OLS regression with robust standard errors. The results 
are presented in table 3. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The  results  show  that  candidate  quality  matters  for  the  outcome  of  the  elections. 
Parties with high quality candidates do better than low quality candidates. Moreover, 
we see that the effect of one standard deviation (2.09) change in the quality of the mean 
successful candidate is about half a percent change in the vote-share. One standard 
deviation (4.23) change in the quality of the ‚best‛ candidate results in a change of   20 
about 1 percent of the vote-share. We are able to reproduce the ‚protest vote‛ effect 
reported  in  previous  studies  (see  Hix  and  Marsh  2007).  Parties  represented  in  the 
government lose on average over 1.7 percent of their vote-share from the previous 
national elections. It is clear that parties with a clear European ‚cause‛ like the Euro-
skeptics and the Greens do better at EP elections than national elections. Finally, size 
matters. Big parties do worse than smaller parties in the EP elections. The effect of one 
standard deviation (13.10) change in the party size amounts to 2.3 percent change in 
the vote-share in the EP election. 
To sum up the effect of candidate quality on electoral performance. First, there 
are substantive differences in the quality of the candidates. Some of this difference can 
be attributed to the electoral system. Candidate centered electoral systems produce 
better candidates. Second, quality candidates increase turnout in EP elections. Third, 
parties that put forward high quality candidates improves their electoral results vis-à-
vis other parties in similar situations.  
 
Candidate activities  
The final part of the analysis focuses on the effect of candidate quality on subsequent 
work  in  the  European  Parliament.  We  are  in  particular  interested  in  finding  out 
whether high quality candidates behave differently in the committee work in the EP 
than  other  candidates.  As  candidate  centered  electoral  systems  produced  higher 
quality candidates, we would like to see if MEPs from these systems take on more 
committee  work.  As  it  is  well  known  that  committee  work  is  fairly  proportionally 
distributed  amongst  party  groups  according  to  number  of  MEPs  (Mamadouth  and 
Raunio 2003), we include dummy-variables for party group. The largest group, the EPP 
is the reference category. The effect of the different party groups is hence the difference 
from MEPs in the EPP. We expect MEPs from the smaller party groups to write the 
fewest reports. We do not expect the difference between the EPP and the PES to be 
very large. It cannot be expected that Euro-skeptic MEPs will write very many reports 
as they will find fewer issues where the majority of the EP can unite behind a position 
they can feel comfortable with, we should expect MEPs from such parties to write 
fewer  reports.  The  flip-side  of  this  argument  is  that  MEPs  from  pro-integrationist   21 
parties will write more reports (Benedetto 2005). We also know that committee chairs 
and vice-chair write more reports than other MEPs (Kreppel 2002). We may also expect 
that  party  leaders  take  on  less  committee  works  as  it  is  considered  the  job  of  the 
backbenchers  of  the  party.  Hence,  we  also  control  for  party-groups  presidents  and 
vice-presidents. The unit of analysis is the individual MEP in one parliamentary term. 
The dependent variable is number of report. We estimate a negative binomial model 
with robust standard errors. The results are reported in Table 4.     
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The results  indicate  that  quality  candidates are  less active  in committee work  than 
those of lesser public visibility. The results are consistent across both models. While 
this may not surprising, it highlights the fact that national party leaderships face hard 
tradeoffs in this situation. They can either improve their electoral chances by relying on 
well known candidates, or be active in the EP committee system, but risking paying an 
electoral cost. However, candidate centered electoral systems produce MEPs that write 
more reports, controlling for candidate quality. MEPs from new member states write 
fewer reports than more established members. MEPs from pro-integrationist parties 
write more reports than other MEPs. Committee chairs and vice chair also write more. 
There is no significant difference between party leaders and other members. However, 
a substantive proportion of the difference is between party groups. MEPs from the EPP 
and the PES write more reports than MEPs from the smaller parties.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Research on EP elections has focused on the second order election effects. Government 
parties tend to get punished. Voters and parties use the elections as a publicly funded 
opinion pool. We do not dispute that this is a key feature of EP elections. However, the 
decision  to  treat  the  elections  as  such  is  ultimately  influenced  by  the  supply  of 
candidates  that  parties  put  on  offer.  Research  on  electoral  politics  in  the  US  has   22 
emphasized  the  importance  of  candidate  quality.  The  focus  has  been  on  reelection 
prospects  and  challenger  deterrence.  High  quality  candidates  face  fewer  quality 
challengers and have higher reelection prospects.  
In this paper, we investigate the effect of candidate quality on EP elections. It is 
well known that many high profile national politicians have gone to the EP towards 
the end of their career. What effect nominating well-known politicians as candidates in 
EP elections has on turnout, electoral fate and subsequent legislative effort in the EP 
has  until  now  not  received  scholarly  attention.  This  paper  is  a  first  attempt  at 
investigating these effects. On the basis of data on all successful candidates to the EP in 
the first 6 direct elections (1979-2004) we are able to offer the following findings. 
First, well known candidates increase turnout in elections. National parties can 
hence reduce  the  perceived lack  of  popular  democratic  legitimacy  of  the  European 
Parliament by nominating better known candidates. Second, parties that put forward 
quality candidates do better in EP elections. Third, there is a cost in terms of legislative 
effort  from  nominating  well  known  candidates.  They  are  less  involved  in  the 
committee work than their less-known party colleagues. These findings highlight a 
potential dilemma. On the one hand, high-profile candidates raise the awareness of the 
European Parliament and mobilize voters. This is a very welcome effect, given the low 
levels of turnout and general lack of interest in the European Parliament. On the other 
hand, our findings suggest that it is the lesser-known ‘careerist’ MEPs who see the EP 
as  their  primary  political  arena  who  do  the  bulk  of  the  work  in  the  European 
Parliament,  whereas  the  high-profile  MEPs  are  more  likely  to  shirk  their 
responsibilities. Voters have little or no information about the performance of their 
MEP, and are therefore unlikely to punish an MEP for poor performance.  This implies 
that while more prominent MEPs would raise the profile of EP elections, this may also 
be to the detriment of the quality of legislative output in the Parliament.    23 
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Figure 1 
Candidate quality in parties by country and year (mean and max) 
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Table 1 
Candidate Quality in the European Parliament 
 
Coeff. Robust SE Coeff. Robust SE
Candidate Centered Elections 1.22*** 0.18 0.75*** 0.23
Electoral Volatility 0.03*** 0.01 0.04 0.03
Government Party 0.25 0.19 0.58 0.58
Party Size 0.008 0.01 0.12*** 0.03
Euro Skeptic Party -0.82** 0.36 -0.50 0.60
Green Party -0.55*** 0.12 -1.06** 0.37
First EP elections 0.59* 0.27 1.21 0.69
Intercept 1.47** 0.63 1.97 1.40
Log 0.76*** 0.09 1.40*** 0.08
Scale 2.13 4.06
N 471 471
Model 1 Model 1
 
 
The dependent variable is mean candidate quality by party (model 1) and max candidate quality by party 
(model 2). The coefficients are from a tobit model with Huber White robust standard errors clustered by 
country.   28 
 
Table 2 
Turnout in European Parliament Elections 
Coeff. Robust SE Coeff. Robust SE
Quality (mean) 2.16* 0.84 - -
Quality (max) - - 0.37* 0.18
Government alternation 12.26*** 2.63 10.66*** 2.69
Candidate Centered Elections 6.20 3.69 9.72* 3.89
Electoral Threshold -0.22* 0.09 -0.22* 0.10
Public Support for the EU 0.30** 0.09 0.29** 0.09
Compulsory Voting 28.37*** 2.91 28.20*** 2.97
First EP Elections 1.66 2.51 2.31 2.66
Intercept -63.50*** 8.03 -60.09*** 7.57
N 85 85
Adjusted R squared .65 .64
Model 1 Model 2
The dependent variable is turnout in EP elections. The estimates are from a linear model with robust 
standard errors.  29 
 
Table 3  
Electoral Success of Parties in European Parliament elections 
 
Coeff. Robust SE Coeff. Robust SE
Quality (mean) 0.23* 0.12 - -
Quality (max) - - 0.24*** 0.07
Government Party -1.66** 0.54 -1.72** 0.54
Party Size -0.17*** 0.02 -0.19*** 0.03
Euro-skeptic Party 7.11*** 1.29 7.03*** 1.24
Green Party 1.27* 0.50 1.43** 0.49
Intercept 2.18*** 0.38 1.92*** 0.34
N 471 471
Adjusted R squared 0.34 0.36
Model 1 Model 2
 
The dependent variable is electoral success. The model is a linear model with Huber White robust 
standard errors.  30 
 
Table 4 
Committee Reports by MEPs 
 
 
Negative binomial 
coeff.
Robust SE
Quality -0.07*** 0.01
First Elections -0.28*** 0.08
EU position 0.04*** 0.01
Candidate Centered Elections 0.53*** 0.15
Committe Chair 1.19*** 0.13
Committee Vice-chair 0.45*** 0.07
Party  president -0.14 0.20
Party Vice president 0.09 0.07
Green Party -0.33** 0.12
Left -0.33*** 0.18
Liberals -0.21 0.11
Non-attached -1.16*** 0.23
Right -0.92*** 0.22
Socialists -0.17* 0.07
Euro-skeptics -1.41*** 0.37
Intercept 0.27* 0.13
N 3284
AIC 11671  
Dependent variable is number of reports. The estimates are coefficients from a negative binomial 
regression  model with Huber White robust standard errors.  31 
 
Appendix: Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1A Individual level descriptive statistics 
 
Individual level Mean SD Min Max Frequency
Reports 2.10 3.80 0 47
Quality 2.14 2.60 0 34
EU Position 14.09 5.00 0.81 20
First EP Elections 0.19 0 1
Candidate Centered Elections 0.03 0 1
Committee Chair 0.05 0 1
Committee Vice Chair 0.12 0 1
Party Group President 0.04 0 1
Party Group Vice President 0.03 0 1
EPP 1356
Green 174
Left 159
Liberals 254
Non-attached 145
Right 82
Social Democrats 1058
Euro-skeptics 56  
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Table 2A Party level descriptive statistics 
 
Party Mean SD Min Max
Electoral fate 0.30 5.70 -31.7 24
Candidate Quality (mean) 2.52 2.10 0 34
Candidate Quality (max) 5.11 4.20 0 34
Govering Party 0.33 0 1
Candidate Centered Elections 0.06 0 1
Electoral Volatility 22.10 7.3 0.5 51
First EP elections 0.19 0 1
Green Party 0.09 0 1
Euro-skeptics 0.05 0 1
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Table 3A Country level descriptive statistics 
 
Country Mean SD Min Max
Turnout -22.60 15.00 -53 1
Candidate Quality (mean) 2.46 1.40 0.82 8
Candidate Quality (max) 10.00 5.50 2 34
Alternating Government 0.63 0 1
Candidate Centered Elections 0.09 0 1
Electoral Threshold 7.15 7.80 0.85 38
Support for the EU 73.30 13 50 96
Electoral Volatility 21.30 8 0.5 51
Compulsory Voting 0.22 0 1
First EP elections 0.22 0 1  
 
 
 
 